Author: David Jacobson

FAQ #6 Update: Landing by night – just as by day – the Jacobson Flare

FAQ #6 Update: Landing by night – just as by day – the Jacobson Flare

A recent question became a timely reminder that an expanded explanation on how to adapt the Jacobson Flare principles to night landings was overdue. So, for current exponents of the JF, here is a suggestion that can tune your night landings into the same, exacting standards that you are now achieving, by day. It updates the information, previously found in FAQ #6, at https://www.jacobsonflare.com/our-most-frequently-asked-landing-questions/

Disclaimer

This is a technical dissertation, intend primarily for more-experienced pilots and to provide an interim supplement to the Jacobson Flare App. Less-experienced pilots are advised to treat the information contained herein, as information, only. Please, do NOT attempt to apply the information, contained herein, if you are a new or yet-to-be user of the Jacobson Flare.

It’s generally NOT a good idea to do anything in an airplane, for the very first time! By this we mean, do it with someone, preferably a flight instructor, who has done it before. Your safety is paramount. So, become proficient at using the Jacobson Flare by day, before attempting to apply it at night.

This information is directed more specifically to pilots of 4-6 place single- and twin-engine-airplanes, below 12,500lb/5,700Kg MTOW, operating onto runways without glideslope guidance.

Any study or application of this content should not be rushed, if full comprehension is to be achieved.

Pilots of larger airplanes should be able to relate the principles to their current airplane, although the aircraft landing lights generally illuminate the runway fixed distance markings well, which helps to identify both the correct visual aim point 1 and the pre-calculated flare cut-off point for the airplane type. Alternatively, please feel welcome to contact info@jacobsonflare.com for further information.

 

Background

Early in the research and development of the Jacobson Flare, around 1985-87, I was a civilian flight instructor at the RAAF Point Cook Flying Club, in addition to my full-time career as an airline transport pilot – at that time, a DC-9-30 line training captain with Trans-Australia Airlines (TAA)/Australian Airlines.

I am not ex RAAF, myself, but was in the ‘right place/right time’, from 1983-89), in a more-or-less voluntary capacity.

The following technique was flight-tested and proven, in C150, PA-28 and PA-38 aircraft, on Runway 17 at RAAF Base Williams, at Point Cook -YMPC – a classic  ‘black-hole’ runway, at night, located SW of Melbourne.

When headed away from the lights of Melbourne city, the immense Port Phillip Bay is the black backdrop and, depending on the prevailing conditions. it can be difficult to discern the horizon. The lights of the Melbourne SE shoreline suburbs are not much help, either, when late on final approach for a landing on 17.

There is no T-VASIS, PAPI or ILS glideslope to ‘hang your hat on‘, so it was a ‘Mk 1 eyeball’ approach. However, this solution proved to work perfectly at YMPC and can be adapted easily to the night situation, at other locations.

Note: If visual glideslope guidance, such as a PAPI system, is available at a particular airfield, then the PAPI aim point comparison calculator (standard in the Jacobson Flare App), together with the published runway edge lighting spacing and the following information, can be applied to ascertain and then optimise the actual PAPI aim point 1 and flare cut-off point for the subject aircraft, in night operations.

Let’s take a look at the following standard 5 JF considerations, to re-examine what we use by day and what we can adapt for night landings.

Note: The ft/m conversions have been rounded, for convenience. This makes no practical difference to the landing outcome.

 

The 5 Jacobson Flare Considerations – Applied to Night Operations

  1. Where to aim?

The JF-suggested visual aim point, for 4-6 place single- and twin-engine-airplanes below 5700Kg MTOW, located at 300ft/90m from the threshold is still ‘King’, to assure approximately 10ft threshold clearance of the main landing gear (MLG). By day it’s the ’top’ of the first centre line mark, past the runway numbers. So it is, normally, by night. Now, the runway edge lighting is a great reference, as you can use the normal (i.e., 90º) axes across the parallel pairs of edge lights, to determine suitable longitudinal references for both the aim point 1 and the flare point.

The standard runway edge lighting spacing is 60m , but a detailed check of this information confirms RAAF Point Cook -YMPC has a non-standard spacing of 85.6m (approx 90m). Like many things in aviation, edge lighting spacing is not as standard as it might be: For example, Australia’s busiest GA training aerodromes: Adelaide Parafield YPPF 03L/21R, Brisbane Archerfield YBAF 10L/28R, Melbourne Moorabbin YMMB 13L/31R and 17L/35R and Sydney Bankstown YSBK 11C/29C, have their runway edge lighting spaced at approx 90m intervals, yet Perth Jandakot YPJT 06L/25R and 12/30 has the runway edge lighting spaced at the standard 60m intervals.

Fortunately, these variations are covered by the 1:20 tolerance of the unique longitudinal flare point principle of the Jacobson Flare. This point is explained, below, in 3. When to flare?

Note: In addition, YSBK 11C/29C and YPJT 24R each have 3º PAPIs, with 25ft MEHTs.* (*Minimum Eye Height at Threshold) 

By night, the runway threshold is marked by the standard runway threshold green lights.

  • At 200ft/60m standard spacing, the 300ft/90m aim point 1 would lie mid-way between the axes of the first and second pairs of edge lights; the flare cut-off point is 100ft/30m back from aim point 1, at 200ft/60m, exactly on the axis of the first row. See the 60m spacing illustration in Fig 1, below:

 

Fig 1

 

  • At 300ft/90m spacing, aim point 1 would fall exactly on the axis across the first pair of edge lights, at 300ft/90m. However, the flare cut-off point would lie 100ft/30m back from there, at 200ft/60m, unserved by any usable or consistent visual cue at night, except the aircraft landing lights. See the 90m spacing illustration in Fig 2, below:

Fig 2

 

Having different aim- and flare-point indicator cues at night, for the same actual aim and flare point locations is less than ideal; and you may or may not have the luxury of being able to check the light spacing before you land somewhere. In any case, the quality of this data may not be all that accurate.

So, to keep things simple, consistent and conservative, let’s establish a single, consistent assumption for all aerodromes that you are likely to use at night:

We have established above that, at 200ft/60m standard spacing, the 300ft/90m aim point 1 would lie mid-way between the axes of the first and second pairs of edge lights; the flare cut-off point is 100ft/30m back from aim point 1, at 200ft/60m, exactly on the axis of the first row.

Now, if the spacing was actually 300ft/90m – BUT, we aimed at the same NIGHT aim point 1, mid-way between the axes of the first and second pairs of edge lights, then the ACTUAL aim point 1 location would be located at 450ft/135m, somewhat deeper.

Given that the certified landing distance is factored (increased) by 67%, this is not a practical issue, as long as the approach is flown accurately, within +5/-0kts. See the 90m spacing illustration in Fig 3,  below:

Fig 3

  1. How to aim?

No change is needed. Fly the same aim point 1/glare shield relationship as by day, controlled with the elevators and the airspeed controlled with power/thrust – to achieve the essential stable approach path.

Aim point 1, as discussed above, is the mid-point of the imagined axis, longitudinally mid-way between the axes of the first and second pairs of edge lights; in other words, the centre of the black space between the first 4 edge lights.

Now, many pilots find that, at night, things seem to be happening ‘faster than by day’, as the airplane approaches the runway, on short final. This may be due to our eyes ‘zooming-in‘, like a camera lens, on the pre-dominant object in the pilot’s view: the runway shape, outlined by the threshold and edge lighting. The rest of the airfield is often very dark.

It has been found very useful to imagine the airfield as it appears by day, or imagine wearing night-vision goggles, so the visual field more resembles the daylight view: the pilot’s eyes don’t ‘zoom-in‘ and the approach groundspeed appears more ‘normal‘.

 

  1. When to flare?

This where the 1:20 advantage of a longitudinal flare point assists, greatly. We already know that the flare cut-off point is 100ft/30m back from aim point 1 – for 4-6 place single- and twin-engine-airplanes, below 5700Kg MTOW.

For 200ft/60m spacing, aim point 1, mid-way between the axes of the first and second pairs of edge lights, is perfectly located at 300ft/90m, so the flare point will be located on the axis through the first pair, at 200ft/60m, exactly as by day.

As stated above, if the spacing was 300ft/90m – and we aimed at the same NIGHT aim point 1 cue, mid-way between the axes of the first and second pairs of edge lights then the ACTUAL aim point 1 location would be located at 450ft/135m, somewhat deeper. The correct flare cut-off point for that aim point location would lie 100ft/30m back from there, at 350ft/105m.

However, to be consistent with the 200ft/60m case, we might wish to use the same flare point indicator, namely the axis of the first pair of edge lighting, at 300ft/90m. This would create an actual flare cut-off distance of 150ft/45m: an error of 50ft/15m.

Yes, it’s a little earlier – and correspondingly higher, BUT:

The longitudinal error is 50ft/15m: Applying the 1:20 advantage, (dividing by 20) indicates a diminished vertical error of just 2.5ft/0.75m. This is well within the vertical tolerance of any landing, flared using the conventional ‘educated guess’ of height.

Speaking of flare point tolerance, it has been found useful to regard the flare point much like a CG, lying within an acceptable range between a forward and an aft limit. This an example of that comparison. Now, at a normal 3-4º approach path angle and flaring over the usual 4-seconds to a new aim point 2, probably at least 2000ft/600m away, or even further, it makes little difference whether you flare at the aft limit, the forward limit, or anywhere in-between: it is relatively insignificant.

Review Figs 1 and 3, above: The edge lighting spacing is different, but we can use the same visual cues for both the aim point 1 and the flare point, for runway edge lighting spacing of 60-90m spacing and the 4-second flare will smooth out the variations in actual flare cut-off distance, between the aim point 1 and the flare point, due to the 1:20 tolerance of using a longitudinal flare cue.

 

Finally, use EVERY cue at your disposal, including your experienced assessment of vertical flare height, too. Triangles still have three sides! We might as well use all of them.

Airline fleets and other advanced types offer the added advantage of computer-generated call-outs of ‘100..50.. 40.. 30.. 20.. 10‘ ft radio altitude (‘radalt‘), from the ground proximity warning systems (GPWS). However, these are still subject to certain limitations, such as radio interference and the mathematical fact that, on the standard 3º flight path angle, every +/- 1ft vertical error compounds as a longitudinal error of +/- 20ft respectively, along the runway.

 

  1. How much to flare?

Again as by day, transition to aim point 2, at the end of the runway lights. For a runway of uniform slope – not necessarily level –  this is the same as used by day: the upwind threshold.

For undulating runways:

Where the landing zone is located on a downhill slope, aim point 2 is relocated to the ‘bottom end‘ of that downhill slope, before the runway becomes more level; geometrically, the flare cue will occur later/lower than the level-runway case. (* See this app Pp 93-95)

Where the landing zone is located on an uphill slope, aim point 2 is relocated to the ‘top end‘, or ‘brow‘ of that uphill slope, before the runway becomes more level; geometrically, the flare cue will occur earlier/higher than the level runway case. (* See this app Pp 93-95)

This technique will assure a more accurate convergence with the landing zone surface in each case.

 

  1. How fast to flare?

The usual Jacobson Flare 4-second technique, or maybe stop the flare at 3-3.5 seconds, if the runway has a lot of water on it, to reduce the risk of aquaplaning.

(In a jet transport airplane, aiming at aim point 2, after completing the full, 4-second flare, can result in too-smooth a landing! The main wheels don’t penetrate the water layer and make proper ground contact, so apart from the risk of aquaplaning, the main wheels don’t spin up to about 700rpm and, in some airplane types, the pre-armed auto brakes and auto-spoilers don’t actuate – they actually get ‘confused‘.)

So, there you go. It’s a bit to digest:  Try drawing it out on some paper, to scale for your airplane; think it through; sit in a chair and visualise the whole thing. And try it, first time, with someone else, preferably a flight instructor, with you, or better still, have a play in a simulator. It may be very beneficial, to prove it to yourself, first.

Use all available cues, including the landing light-illumination of the centreline and fixed distance runway markings and your accumulated experience, (together with the GPWS ‘radalt’ callouts in larger aircraft), in assessing your height above the runway.

Of the three components to any landing:

1. The initial pilot’s eye path to aim point 1;

2. The commencement point of the flare; and

3. The flare, itself, through to the second aim point, usually at the far, upwind threshold:

The first is the most important; second most is the third and the least important is the flare initiation point, so long as it is within that ‘range of acceptable flare points/heights‘ for the airplane type, as discussed above.

Finally, to reiterate, the one aim point 1 – at 1.5 rows of edge lights – and the one flare point – at the first row of edge lights – may be applied for runway edge lighting spacing of 60-90m spacing and the 4-second flare will smooth out the differences. See the generic spacing illustration for 60-90m edge lighting spacing in Fig 4, below:

 

Fig 4

Wishing you many safe landings

 

Captain David M Jacobson FRAeS MAP

 

Would you care to experience that unsurpassed sense of accomplishment, derived from executing consistently beautiful landings, more often?

For starters, Download the FREE Jacobson Flare LITE, our no fuss/no frills introduction. Here we demonstrate, step by step, the application of the Jacobson Flare on a typical grass airstrip at Porepunkah, YPOK.

 

We invite you to browse the consistently positive comments on our Testimonials page. Many pilots, of all levels of experience, have downloaded our Apps. Read about their own experiences with the Jacobson Flare technique and the App.

Then download the COMPLETE Jacobson Flare app – for iOS. You’re already possibly paying $300+/hour to hire an aeroplane: You’ll recover the cost of the app, in just ONE LESS-NEEDED CIRCUIT. Moreover, you’ll have an invaluable reference tool, throughout your entire life in aviation.

Download the COMPLETE Jacobson Flare App for iOS devices now.

 

We invite you, also, to review our new, FREE companion app,

offering a convenient way of staying abreast of our latest blogs.

 

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DJ B737-800W Melbourne VIC 22 June 2009

A few ‘pearls …’ Building pilots’ resilience in aviation

A few ‘pearls …’ Building pilots’ resilience in aviation

Over the years, one picks up many pearls of wisdom that shape our rapport with aviation: They could be gems offered by other pilots; they may come from something you read, perhaps from another’s own experience; or events that you experience, yourself, along the way.

In recent discussion, topics such as decision-making, threat and error management and embracing long-established standard operating procedures (SOPs) and cockpit resource management (CRM) have been floated past me. These essential yet sometimes intangible subjects can perhaps be included under the generic title, ‘building resilience’. It seems appropriate to share some of the ‘HOW’ to achieve some basic understanding of all this by recalling some ‘pearls’ that made themselves known to me along the way, since 1965.

This is the seventh article in a planned occasional series, sharing some most memorable and treasured experiences. This one is another from my own career : We do plan to feature other highly esteemed pilot friends and colleagues, who are only too willing to share their collective aviation experience. The crucial lessons that we learned along the way are just as valid today. They contribute, in no small way, to that intangible but essential quality known in aviation as ‘airmanship’.

Where possible, I shall acknowledge the sources of this collection of acquired wisdom that has served me well, not only in aviation, but in everyday life, as well. I commend it, especially, to inspire pilots just starting out. So, in no particular order:

 

Personal accountability

In 1965, my first flight instructor explained, “There is no excuse for a taxying accident.” He was so right.

Not much later, my Chief Flying Instructor (CFI) offered some sage advice: “When you’ve flown 100 hours, you’ll think you know it all; when you’ve gained 200 hours, you’ll know you know it all; and when you’ve reached 2000 hours, you’ll know you’ll never know it all!’  Well, even after 24,500 hours and 56 years exposure, I still feel like I just scratched the surface.

My CFI was the legendary ‘Jock’ Garden and he added this little gem after an assessment flight, when I had completed my first 3 hours of instrument flight training:

David, there are very few born instrument pilots – and you are not one of them!” As an 18-yo, that was somewhat deflating, but again, he was right: I really had to work at it.

Around 22 years later, in 1987, I was by now a (line) training captain and Jock was a passenger on my Trans-Australia Airlines’ (TAA) DC-9-30, flying from Melbourne to Adelaide and made it known that he was ‘down the back’. Naturally, I invited him up the flight deck for a quick chat (this was long before ‘9-11‘) and he remained with us for our descent and landing. After shutdown, I reminded him of his 1965 assessment of my instrument flying skills:

“Well”, he said, with a broad grin, “it must have worked. Look where you are, now!”

 

Through the B737-800 HUD : heading West, climbing to FL 400, at M 0.785 : Competency in instrument flying had its own rewards    © dj image

 

Common sense

There are some self-explanatory and sobering oldies and goodies, like, “The runway behind you, like the altitude above you and the fuel remaining in the tanker, are of no further use to you“, which do stimulate sound flight planning.

Upon my timely retirement from Qantas Airways Ltd, in February 2010, in a note of farewell published in the company’s flight ops newsletter, I summarised the ‘BIG 4’, of all the lessons I learned since 1965, including 40 years of airline flying:

Know when to go sick -Are you fit to fly? This includes personal issues, as well as medical; seek support and/or professional help;
Know when to go around  Don’t succumb to ‘press-on-itis’ – we rarely get a good landing off a bad approach;
Know when to divert or to turn back – If VFR-limited, you cannot teach yourself to fly on instruments in the last 30 seconds of your life; and
Know when to go – Be self-aware of your own limitations and bow out gracefully, before having to be reminded by others, or failing that last, one-too-many simulator or route checks.

 

Professional standards

In the second article in this series, ‘The best advice I was ever offered : from the best pilot I ever flew with’, published 7 July 2020, I referred, primarily, to Captain Geoff Lushey, who advised me, back in 1970, “It doesn’t matter when something goes wrong – What matters is what you do about it!‘. The same article includes a quotable quote from Captain Col Tiller, another very intelligent and perceptive TAA pilot. He told our cohort of inductees to TAA, earlier that same year, “When you pass a check, it only means you’ve been operating safely for the last 6 months: it has no bearing, whatsoever, on the next 6. On the other hand, if you fail a check, you haven’t just had a bad day: you’ve been unsafe for the last 6 months!I proved him dead right: read the article (from the link above, or the JF News App), for the details!

In 1971, as a 23-yo and just one year into my airline career with TAA, I had the opportunity to convert from the Fokker F27 Friendship to the McDonnell Douglas DC-9-30, my first jet. We completed the engineering and full-flight simulator courses in Melbourne, but the airline was still taking delivery of the type and couldn’t spare any aircraft off-line, for training purposes. We had, instead, the privilege of completing the 10-hour base flying component of the conversion with Hawaiian Airlines, based in Honolulu. (A tough gig, but someone had to do it!). My instructor was Captain Howard Phillips, Hawaiian’s most senior pilot and instructor. In just 2 years, I had leapt from flying a Cessna 337 with a maximum take-off weight of 4300lbs/1950kg, to the F27 at 43,500lb/19,731kgs and now the DC-9 at 100,000lbs/45,360kg. They were big steps.

I explained how I’d struggled a bit, initially, in the DC-9 simulator, trying not to over-control with aileron and rudder on asymmetric take-offs (simulated engine failures and fires). He responded, “Oh, a lot of our guys do that, too and you know what I tell ’em? I tell ’em to hold that ‘pole‘ (meaning all of the flight controls) like you’re tryin’ to milk a mouse (meaning very, very gently)!” Some homespun philosophy, perhaps, but it conveyed the message – and it sure works!

Captain Howard Phillips had another gem, too; perfect for those occasions when you realise your ‘mental-workload-required‘ is starting to exceed your ‘brain-power-available‘:  “When you’re up to your ass in alligators, it’s sometimes real (sic) difficult to remember that your initial aim was to drain the swamp!

 

Non-normal situations

As a kid, I recall Walt Disney hosting a TV episode of Disneyland and quoting Davy Crockett – the legendary US Frontiersman & Congressman. According to Disney, Crockett’s motto was, ‘Be sure you’re right – and then go ahead.’

Interestingly, when TAA introduced their initial and pioneering version of CRM, (which they termed Aircrew Team Management (ATM) in 1984, part of our training involved a problem-solving model known by its acronym, ‘S-A-D-I-E‘. The initials stood for the following steps and they expand on Davy Crockett’s motto:

Share the information available;
Analyse the information;
Develop a solution;
Implement the solution;
Evaluate the solution.

If the solution is not successful, repeat the last 3 steps, several times if necessary.

Along the way, in simulator training and licence checks, I learned the essential quality of sometimes ‘sitting on my hands’: in other words, not acting impulsively or precipitously. When suffering the loss of power or thrust, in a twin-engine airplane, it’s obviously vital NOT to shut down the wrong engine: it gets very quiet, very quickly! And, sadly, it has been done many times, with fatal consequences. The point is beautifully illustrated by a piece I read once, from a USAF test pilot:

When something does go wrong in an airplane, the very first thing I do is to start a stopwatch; it meets two fundamental human requirements:

It satisfies the intuitive urgency within us to do something immediately; and
It’s relatively harmless!

 

Operational pressures

In the airline environment and, I dare say, in the GA and military sectors, too, commercial and operational factors often place great pressure on pilots-in-command, to ‘get going’, often against their better judgment. When that pressure occurs, it’s vital to make a deliberate effort to slow down, ‘start that stopwatch’ and carefully apply the effective ‘S-A-D-I-E’ model.

A dispatch officer or company manager probably doesn’t have the full picture that you do. Remember that, when things go wrong, after departure, the responsibility for ‘everything’ rests with the pilot in command. Younger and less experienced commanders are vulnerable to these pressures and it shows, especially to the highly professional cabin service managers (CSMs) and flight attendants, with whom we share our responsibilities and duties of care for our passengers. I was once complimented and asked by one of our most professional CSMs, of 30+ years’ experience: “How do you stay so even, every time we fly with you? We always know it will be safe, professional and fun working with you.”

I hadn’t ever thought consciously about that, but I thanked her and was somehow able to summon the following response:

When I go flying, I have 4 priorities:

The safety of the airplane and my crew;
The security and comfort of my passengers;
Meeting the regulations and requirements of the government’s licensing authority; and finally,
Meeting the requirements of my employer.”

Now, it may seem odd, placing the Company last, but I figured that if I satisfied the first three priorities, my employer should have no cause for complaint – and, importantly, it placed that last element in its proper perspective:

OK, we’ve satisfied the first 3, now how can we best address that commercial element?’

Thinking further on this topic, later, I realised that I’d probably done this, subconsciously, ever since completing my first solo, as a 17-yo, way back in 1965; and my ‘second solo’ as a 34-yo, newly-minted F27 captain, in 1981.

It may also explain why professional pilots don’t necessarily feel the weight of responsibility for the safety of 36 or 174 or 400+ passengers. We would operate a freighter flight or ferry an empty airplane exactly the same way as if we had a full complement of fare-paying passengers.

Lesser Pressures: The ‘storm in the teacup’

In aviation, as in life, there are often some employment or other less important pressures that, while not operational, can nevertheless cause us stress and even grief to a disproportionate degree.

A beautiful solution was suggested to me by B747-400 Captain and Pilot Association President, Graeme Cant, back in 1993, when he offered the following:

When a storm blows up (- perhaps an industrial one -) the first thing I do is to go to my kitchen crockery cupboard and see what size teacup I need to contain it!’

 

Command upgrades

As a training captain for many years, on the DC-9-30 and, later, the B737-300/-400/-800, I was often asked by senior first officers, anticipating their own upgrade to initial command:

We’re licensed to the same standards; we already hold a command instrument rating and first-class airplane endorsement and I’ve been a FO for 8-/10-/12+ years. We share the flying, mostly ‘leg-for-leg’, so what’s the essential difference between how you operate from that LH seat, compared with what I do from the RH seat?

The basic premise of the question was spot-on. We did share the roles of ‘pilot-flying‘ and ‘pilot supporting‘ alternately and, as a training captain, I did fly and support from the RH seat, too, whenever I had the privilege of training a new captain, as he or she settled into the LH seat and its attendant, additional responsibilities. So I was current in both roles and I reckon the RH seat workload is higher. So, it was a great and a fair question – and therein lies a clue. My reply was, usually:

As a first officer, you’ve become accustomed to being able to answer – or know where to find the answers – to most things. As a captain, you’ve got to know the questions.” This was not meant to be a glib throw-away line. By this, I meant that professional captains are always asking themselves, ‘What if …?‘, trying to anticipate all possible scenarios and potential outcomes that may affect their present operation.

As a practical and valuable example, many aircraft type non-normal quick-reference handbooks (QRHs) include a procedure, detailing the failure of ALL generators, which could place the aircraft in the situation of relying solely on a ‘Standby‘ or ‘Emergency’ DC power supply, powered by the battery system, for just 30-60 minutes. It’s common for pilots to note or even commit to memory, the minimal electrical services available on ‘Standby Power’. But a great question is: ‘What services have we lost, if we have the generators and main electrical systems operating normally, but the ‘Standby’ orEmergency’ DC power supply fails?‘ It’s generally ignored, as a ‘cannot possibly happen‘ event. if it can be imagined, it can happen.

In the case of the wonderful Fokker F27 Friendship, (my first airliner and my first airline command aircraft), along with other  services lost when operating with the emergency DC power supply failed, ‘Ground Fine’ pitch or 0º pitch angle could not be selected on the propellers: the blade angle would ‘hang-up’ on the 16.5º fine pitch ‘stop(designed to prevent fine pitch blade angles in flight, which could overspeed the propellers) and, after completing a landing with this condition, the Rolls-Royce Dart engines – turning at significantly reduced RPM – would probably overheat and melt turbine blades onto the runway or taxiway, through high internal temperatures and insufficient airflow!

The only solution to protect those engines, was to shut them both down after such a landing, BEFORE decelerating through about 40 Kts – and then requesting a tow to the terminal! And this serious point was NOT highlighted in the manufacturer’s or airlines’ flight operating or training manuals.

While operating a flight sector, great flight crew members, not just commanders, will  be thinking ahead to the next leg and the next: weather considerations, fuel requirements, payload or airplane performance limitations, non-standard configuration considerations: the list goes on. But, with a conscientious work ethic and quality training, it’s not a chore. Command training should be fun, re-affirming everything you’ve learned throughout your career to date and adding your stamp to it. You’ve done the hard work, over many years. Now is the time to apply it. Enjoy!

 

Fearful flyers

A sad reality is that some of our passengers develop a fear of flying, for all sorts of reasons, generally not due to anything that they, themselves, have experienced. It is often due to a simple lack of understanding of how an airplane flies and ‘manages to stay up there.’ Sometimes, a friend or relative has scared them with a tale based on heresy, not fact.

Prior to ‘9-11’, it was sometimes possible, operationally, to invite a nervous passenger to visit the flight deck and it paid instant dividends -always. We could answer their specific questions or concerns; they could see that nothing was happening quickly on the flight deck, even though we were moving through the atmosphere at 450kts or 900km/hr. Often, the response was so apparent that we might extend an invitation to the passenger to remain with us, strap in to the ‘spare jump seat’ and a headset and experience the rare privilege of sharing the descent and landing, at our destination. In my experience, the results achieved were 110% successful! Passengers disembarked smiling, fully relaxed and would often stay, “Thank you so much, I’m cured!

Very often, it seemed that the word, FEAR had been mis-represented as an acronym, F-E-A-R: ‘Fantasy – Expressed -As -Reality‘.

Fear of Flying‘ courses are sponsored by many airlines, to assist passengers to alleviate these unfortunate feelings. They are highly recommended.

Finally, without in any way wishing to diminish the reality of the ‘fearful flyer’ condition, let’s conclude with the light-hearted preface from ‘Spitfire Parade‘, one of the many books in the famous series of  children’s (and parent’s-) own’ ‘Biggles‘ books (and radio serials) by Captain W.E Johns, highlighting the life and times of the fictitious British WW2 pilot and, later, Scotland Yard air detective Air Inspector James Biggleworth, known far and wide as ‘Biggles‘. Entitled ‘Biggles’ Philosophy‘, it went like this:

 

‘When you are flying, everything is either all right, or it’s not alright.

If it is alright, there is no need to worry; if it’s not alright, one of two things is certain:

Either you are in trouble, or you’re not in trouble.

If you are not in trouble, there is no need to worry; if you are in trouble, one of two things is certain:

Either you will crash, or you won’t crash.

If you don’t crash, there is no need to worry; if you do crash, one of two things is certain:

Either you will be injured, or you won’t be injured.

If you are not injured, there is no need to worry; if you are injured, one of two things is certain:

Either you’ll recover, or you won’t recover.

If you do recover, there is no need to worry;

And, finally, if you don’t recover, you can’t worry!’

 

The bottom line

It may become apparent, if not already, that many, if not all of the above vignettes apply not only to aviation, but in everyday life, as well. They certainly have, for me.

 

Wishing you many safe landings

 

Captain David M Jacobson FRAeS MAP

 

Would you care to experience that unsurpassed sense of accomplishment, derived from executing consistently beautiful landings, more often?

For starters, Download the FREE Jacobson Flare LITE, our no fuss/no frills introduction. Here we demonstrate, step by step, the application of the Jacobson Flare on a typical grass airstrip at Porepunkah, YPOK.

 

We invite you to browse the consistently positive comments on our Testimonials page. Many pilots, of all levels of experience, have downloaded our Apps. Read about their own experiences with the Jacobson Flare technique and the App.

Then download the COMPLETE Jacobson Flare app – for iOS. You’re already possibly paying $300+/hour to hire an aeroplane: You’ll recover the cost of the app, in just ONE LESS-NEEDED CIRCUIT. Moreover, you’ll have an invaluable reference tool, throughout your entire life in aviation.

Download the COMPLETE Jacobson Flare App for iOS devices now.

 

We invite you, also, to review our new, FREE companion app,

offering a convenient way of staying abreast of our latest blogs.

 

Download the Jacobson Flare NEWS App for iOS devices now.

Conscientious airplane walk-arounds are never a waste of time

Conscientious airplane walk-arounds are never a waste of time

The pre-flight walk-around inspection of an aircraft, by the pilot or a trusted crew member is a time-honoured, vital facet of good airmanship. Generations of great pilots have always taken the time and trouble, in all weathers, to take a good look before taking off. The evocative expression, ‘kicking the tyres‘ (to listen for a different tone from one –  indicating a possible discrepancy in tyre pressure) harks back to the ‘good old days’, when there was substantially less engine noise around tarmacs. In approximately 20,000 walk-arounds, over 55 years, only 3 paid a bountiful dividend – but the rest were never a waste of time.

This is the sixth article in a planned occasional series, sharing some most memorable and treasured experiences. This one is another from my own career : We do plan to feature other highly esteemed pilot friends and colleagues, who are only too willing to share their collective aviation experience. The crucial lessons that we learned along the way are just as valid today. They contribute, in no small way, to that intangible but essential quality known in aviation as ‘airmanship’.

Of all the walk-arounds I ever performed, only 3 of them ‘worked!

 

  1. 1967 : The Auster

The first of my ‘big 3’ occurred in August 1967, when employed as a 20-yo junior flight instructor. I was tasked with flying a wonderful antique Auster J5L to a nearby country airfield and wait most of the day, while a 100-hour engineering inspection was carried out. Around 1600hrs, the engineers wheeled the airplane out of their maintenance hangar and handed me the new Maintenance Release. “Jump in”, said the chief maintenance engineer,we’ll give you a swing on the propeller.” (The de Havilland Gypsy Major engine, fitted to the Auster, didn’t have a starter motor.)

Hang on“, I replied, “I haven’t carried out a walk-around.”   “Mate“, said the engineer, grinning smugly  to his colleagues, “She’s just come out of the 100-hourly!

I was thinking, ‘All the more reason’, but I returned, simply, “Thanks, but I have never yet flown an airplane without having first walked around it and I don’t intend to vary that policy, today“. “But there’s some nasty weather headed this way – hop in and we’ll get you going. I ignored this last entreaty, totally; it was 1600 hrs on a Friday afternoon and these guys simply wanted me gone, so they could have a beer, before heading off home. I surveyed the sky and there was some approaching low cloud and rain showers; my outbound track back home was reasonably clear and the showers were still about 20 minutes away.

I circumnavigated the airplane. I had witnessed it being pushed out of the hangar after a supposedly-thorough 100-hourly maintenance inspection. It should have been perfect – yet I discovered 2 unbelievable derelictions of care and responsibility:

  1.  The right aileron cable was disconnected and was lying loose and visible, below the fabric-covered wingtip; and
  2.  The engine oil cap was missing : An apprentice engineer was dispatched to the hangar and he located it on a workbench.

While these 2 blunders were being remedied, the other engineers had formed a small semi-circle and, like me, were awaiting their boss’s response to these serious lapses: There was no apology, no contrition, just, “Well, fellers, there’s a careful pilot for you!” I was dismayed and disgusted. I just strapped myself in; someone swung the propeller for me and I just taxied away and departed for home, trying hard to put it out of my mind.

Had I departed without completing that walk around, I would have undoubtedly had the character-building experience of a certain engine failure or seizure on or after take-off, followed by the twin challenges of executing a full forced landing with an oil-covered windscreen and partly functioning or, worse still, jammed aileron controls – in approaching bad weather.

My employer never again returned to that maintenance organisation, yet I was instructed not to submit an air safety incident report. I still regret not doing so. Their collective negligence could have proved fatal – to me.

 

  2.  1984 : The DC-9-30

October 1984 found me completing my command upgrade to the beautiful DC-9-30. On a regular Melbourne to Hobart return flight – MEL-HBA-MEL – my training captain and I were on the turn-around, in Hobart. While executing a second walk-around inspection (following my initial one, completed in Melbourne prior to departure), I was circumnavigating anti-clockwise around the DC-9, dodging the usual collection of obstacles such as refuelling hoses and pump vehicles and heading for the left wheel well, when I noticed something ‘odd‘ sticking out at an odd angle, from the leading edge of the left main landing gear door section, fastened to the gear leg. The door edge was well-silhouetted against the clear sky and the view was foreign to my eyes. I moved closer, to investigate.

Almost simultaneously, our very conscientious ground licensed aircraft maintenance engineer -LAME – was homing in as well. We just looked at each other, as the reality dawned on us: the object projecting out from the door’s leading edge was an almost-separated 100mm/4-inch-long section of the stainless steel strip, fastened along one edge of its curved profile, that is pressed against and forms a seal with the underside of the wing, when the doors close during the landing gear retraction cycle. This particular section had fatigued from normal wear and tear and was hanging on only by a 1/4 inch/6mm ‘thread’. The engineer broke it off and I asked to keep it, as a souvenir.

For what we had both realised from the outset, was that on the next take-off – our departure from Hobart – or a subsequent one, that loose fragment was very likely to separate completely – and it was perfectly aligned with the intake of the left engine, mounted on the aft fuselage. On initial take-off rotation, with the main landing gear still on the ground and the engines much lower than usual – and a 135 kt/270km/hr air blast tearing at it, that little fragment could have totally destroyed the left engine and given this commander-under-training a very real-world ‘engine failure/fire/severe damage’ situation to deal with, instead of a routine simulator training exercise.

That fragment has resided on the wall of my study, ever since.

 

3.  2002 : The B737-800

My First Officer and I had already flown from Melbourne to Brisbane, to crew a further night B737-800 service – in a different airplane – to overnight in Cairns, in far North Queensland (FNQ). I was waiting on the tarmac, as our second aircraft taxyed in and shut-down, at 2030hrs AEST.

As soon as the rotating beacons were extinguished, I commenced my walk-around inspection under the tarmac lighting, proceeding anti-clockwise around the airplane from the nose, as was my habit, differing from the published clockwise recommendation. (It always made more sense to me to proceed anti-clockwise, as the light switch for the main landing gear (MLG) wheel wells was located on the left-hand side and, at night, could provide the necessary illumination at the earliest opportunity. Even armed with a torch, the full illumination was very helpful.)

The B737 doesn’t have doors to enclose the wheel wells when the MLG is retracted, only small doors fitted to the MLG legs : the MLG wheels and tyres, themselves, form the wheel well seal, following retraction. Ground access into the wheel wells is relatively simple, if a little challenging, to avoid the black tyre rubber ‘skid marks‘ on one’s uniform shirt, resulting from brushing up against the rubber sealing panels for the tyres, that line the circular wheel-well opening.

The space inside the main gear wheel well is subdivided, longitudinally by the substantial ‘keel beam‘, which, as in a boat or ship, forms the basis of the longitudinal strength of the entire structure, much like a spine. Measuring some 300mm/12 inches wide, at this point, its flat top surface serves as a platform to support a number of component parts, such as hydraulic lines, electrical cable runs and some various other small component assemblies. It looks a bit cluttered but after many years and many walk-arounds, it had for me the familiar look of an untidy desk; ‘it could be tidier but, at least, I do know where everything is‘, I was thinking. But amongst the familiar clutter, something seemed different.

I took a second look around the L wheel-well, without satisfying my initial curiosity and exited back out, to continue my walk around the left wing and engine. ‘I’d take a fresh look, when I reached the other wheel well on the right side’, I figured. After checking the tail and right wing and engine, I ducked under the wing centre section and stood fully upright again, taking in the space from the opposite side. Again, everything seemed familiar and intact –  no leaks – nothing out of place – until

I looked closely at the central keel beam, again. My initial thought was confirmed: there was something different – a small can, something like the size, shape and silver colour of an airline-sized can of ‘Diet-Coke‘, but not that, resting happily on the keel beam. On top of it, lay a 1/2in drive socket open-ended spanner head and a thread of steel wire protruded from a small aperture, beneath the spanner. The canister, itself, was sitting against one of the hydraulic line runs that was acting as a ‘safety railing’, about 30mm/1.5in, above the keel beam. Otherwise, it was totally unrestrained to the left, forward, aft and vertically. In other words, loose. I realised that it had been in its present location when the airplane landed, just before 2030hrs, as no other person had been near the wheel wells, except me. I picked up the intruder, spanner included and the weight impressed me, for such a relatively small item. It was a virtually full canister of 0.0030 inch stainless steel locking wire, used by engineers to secure nuts and other assemblies.

I exited the wheel well again, just as a ground maintenance engineer approached. “Oh, thanks“, he said, offering to relieve me of it; “We’ve been looking for that!

No“, I replied, “This is mine, for now – where is your tarmac foreman’s office located?” He indicated. I walked over and into the office, holding up the canister and the spanner head, in each hand.

Oh thanks, Captain, said the tarmac foreman, as I handed them to him. We’ve been looking for those two items, since midnight, last night – they were not accounted for : Where did you find them?”  On the keel beam of the -800 over on Gate 23, when I was completing my walk-around“, I replied. “Didn’t that airplane just arrive – from Cairns?”   “Yes“, I said. He consulted the airplane’s movements for the day, on his computer. “Then” he said, looking quite shocked, those bits have been sitting on that keel beam ever since midnight, last night – for over 20 hours. The airplane has done 4 return trips to FNQ, so far today. Somehow, they haven’t fallen out, or been jolted out on landing and not one crew member or ground engineer has noticed them, until now.” 

I was already thinking of just some of the many variations of possibilities that could have ensued, during the 8 previous flight, such as:

  • The maelstrom of airflow around the open wheel wells, on any of the 8 take-offs or landings conducted before I noticed those foreign objects, could have dragged increasing lengths of the lock wire out of the canister, forming a ‘spider’s web‘ of stainless steel lock wire which, on landing gear retraction or extension, could have wreaked havoc on any of the hundreds of innocent and unsuspecting electrical and hydraulic components, anywhere in that wheel well; it would undoubtedly led to a very difficult situation for the operating crew, trying to troubleshoot, sifting through a litany of false warnings as well as real ones.

 

  • Either the spanner head, or the canister itself, could have been jolted or simply fallen out, as the airplane manoeuvred after takeoff or, especially, on approach to landing, over the cities of Brisbane or Cairns. As weighty projectiles, they could have easily killed someone, or crashed through a building window or vehicle windscreen.

 

  • Either item, or both, could have fallen out onto a tarmac, taxiway or runway and caused a foreign object hazard for the engines or tyres of the next-passing airplane : Remember the fatal Concorde tragedy?

On this occasion, after conferring with the Company Flight Safety Manager, I did submit an Aviation Safety Incident Report (ASIR) on this significant lapse in standard maintenance procedures. Nevertheless, I did have some nightmares about the various possibilities, for some time, in the months that followed.

The major lesson I learned from these 3 incidents, roughly 20 years apart over those years, was that no matter what time constraints may be present, the simple walk-around inspection is non-negotiable and must be conscientious, even if you end up finding nothing wrong. 3 problems, in 55 years and approximately 20,000 walk-arounds, is a very low score; but it is still 3 more than it should have been. They underscore the overwhelming need for standard operating procedures (SOPs) to be followed by all who commit – and support aviation, in all its facets.

Walk-around : Qantas Airways’ first B737-800 VH-VXA on arrival Brisbane Australia, from Seattle USA, via Honolulu USA and  Nandi Fiji: 31 Jan 2002

 

Wishing you many safe landings

 

Captain David M Jacobson FRAeS MAP

 

Would you care to experience that unsurpassed sense of accomplishment, derived from executing consistently beautiful landings, more often?

For starters, Download the FREE Jacobson Flare LITE, our no fuss/no frills introduction. Here we demonstrate, step by step, the application of the Jacobson Flare on a typical grass airstrip at Porepunkah, YPOK.

 

We invite you to browse the consistently positive comments on our Testimonials page. Many pilots, of all levels of experience, have downloaded our Apps. Read about their own experiences with the Jacobson Flare technique and the App.

Then download the COMPLETE Jacobson Flare app – for iOS. You’re already possibly paying $300+/hour to hire an aeroplane: You’ll recover the cost of the app, in just ONE LESS-NEEDED CIRCUIT. Moreover, you’ll have an invaluable reference tool, throughout your entire life in aviation.

Download the COMPLETE Jacobson Flare App for iOS devices now.

 

We invite you, also, to review our new, FREE companion app,

offering a convenient way of staying abreast of our latest blogs.

 

Download the Jacobson Flare NEWS App for iOS devices now.

Non-normal checklists don’t always cover the situation

Non-normal checklists don’t always cover the situation

Throughout an aviation career spanning 55 years and 24,500 hours, a pilot is bound to encounter some non-normal situations along the way. Licence renewal checks, conducted in the modern and very sophisticated digital flight simulators offer fantastic, accelerated learning experiences for pilots at all levels, with zero safety risk to crews and airplanes. However, unless a company flight training department – or an individual flight instructor/examiner – has some imagination, most exercises rely heavily on the manufacturer’s Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) and its unique and quite definitive Non-Normal checklists for the airplane type.

The non-normal events that I experienced, over that 55-year period, were more often than not either a combination of issues from more than one system, or an issue out of ‘left field‘, that did not match, exactly, any non-normal checklist. The ability of pilots to think ‘outside the square’ is a definite advantage.

This is the fifth article in a planned occasional series, sharing some most memorable and treasured experiences. This one is also from my own career : We do plan to feature other, highly esteemed pilot friends and colleagues, who are only too willing to share their collective aviation experience. The crucial lessons that we learned along the way are just as valid today. They contribute, in no small way, to that intangible but essential quality known in aviation as ‘airmanship’.

A great example of this is a non-normal landing I once executed at Adelaide, South Australia, in a B737-400. On approach to runway 23, flaps 1º extended perfectly normally, with correct indications for both leading and trailing edge flaps. On selection of flaps 5º, The flap gauge L & R needles ’stuck’, just as the second stage, Flaps 5º was running. The anticipated change in trim seemed to suggest that the flaps had run to 5º, but my First Officer and I couldn’t confirm this on the flap gauge. Further, the B737 flap asymmetry protection system takes its signals from the L and R flap gauge needles – and the gauge was now u/s. The leading edge devices were confirmed as fully extended by their separate LED indicators and, cross-checking attitude, airspeed and thrust setting,  we believed that we probably had trailing edge flaps at 5º. We just couldn’t confirm this, as there are no painted ‘witness’ position calibration marks presented on the flaps, as they extend.

After referring to the Non-normal checklists, we established that there wasn’t a dedicated procedure for this particular issue. On conferring with our company engineers by radio, we decided it was prudent NOT to attempt any further flap extension or retraction in the air (in case of any uncontrollable flap asymmetry), and to make the conservative assumption that the trailing edge flaps were fully ‘up’, i.e., 0º and execute a Trailing Edge Flaps-Up landing, as per the non-normal landing checklist for that condition.

At our landing weight, the Vref 40 (1.3 Vs for Flaps 40) airspeed was 136 KIAS. Adding 5kts made the VApp airspeed 141 KIAS. With the trailing edge flaps at 0º, the further additive for the higher Vs was another 40 kts, so we made our final approach at 181 KIAS! That looked pretty fast, as we crossed the threshold.

I aimed at the standard B737 aiming point, at 1000ft from the threshold and flared as the glare shield passed the 500ft point – same as for a normal Flaps 30º or 40º, utilising my own ‘Jacobson Flare’ technique. The only correction I needed to make was to position the aim point 1 LOWER in the windscreen, due the much higher nose-up body angle (8-9º, instead of the usual 2.5-3º nose-up), using the autopilot-coupled ILS to confirm both glide path and visual eye path.

We actually touched down in the pre-determined spot – aiming point 1 – same as any JF landing and I rolled through to the full length of the runway, to spare the brakes, wheels and tyres from excessive heat – and to take full advantage of the Aviation Rescue and Fire Fighting units we had requested to attend, to deal with the possible event of any tyre or brake failure or fire. When we shut down, the brakes were probably cooler than for a normal landing, when we might brake more heavily, to make a designated runway exit taxyway. On turn-around, the flap indicator gauge was replaced and the issue was resolved.

The lessons learned and offered are that:

1.    Sometimes, a non-normal event doesn’t exactly match a published non-normal procedure.

2.   The Jacobson Flare self-compensates for these non-normal flap configurations and airspeeds. Just remember that the aim point position in the windscreen might vary from its usual position for a normal landing, due to a different airplane body angle caused by the different flap configuration. The longitudinal flare fix of the Jacobson Flare also self-compensates, automatically, for uphill- and downhill-sloping runways, approach path angle variations and the classic cause of flare ‘height‘ illusions, runway widths different from those of our more familiar airports.

 

Wishing you many safe landings

 

Captain David M Jacobson FRAeS MAP

 

Would you care to experience that unsurpassed sense of accomplishment, derived from executing consistently beautiful landings, more often?

For starters, Download the FREE Jacobson Flare LITE, our no fuss/no frills introduction. Here we demonstrate, step by step, the application of the Jacobson Flare on a typical grass airstrip at Porepunkah, YPOK.

 

We invite you to browse the consistently positive comments on our Testimonials page. Many pilots, of all levels of experience, have downloaded our Apps. Read about their own experiences with the Jacobson Flare technique and the App.

Then download the COMPLETE Jacobson Flare app – for iOS. You’re already possibly paying $300+/hour to hire an aeroplane: You’ll recover the cost of the app, in just ONE LESS-NEEDED CIRCUIT. Moreover, you’ll have an invaluable reference tool, throughout your entire life in aviation.

Download the COMPLETE Jacobson Flare App for iOS devices now.

 

We invite you, also, to review our new, FREE companion app,

offering a convenient way of staying abreast of our latest blogs.

 

Download the Jacobson Flare NEWS App for iOS devices now.

Trust your instincts – your natural Master Warning system

Trust your instincts – your natural Master Warning system

Nearly 30 years ago while suffering from sinusitis, I had been on a few days’ sick leave. The lessons I learned, from a premature return to my airline flight duties as a B737 Captain were well worthwhile : and well worth sharing. Sometimes, things just don’t feel quite right …

This is the fourth article in a planned occasional series, sharing some most memorable and treasured experiences. This one is also from my own career : We do plan to feature other, highly esteemed pilot friends and colleagues, who are only too willing to share their collective aviation experience. The crucial lessons that we learned along the way are just as valid today. They contribute, in no small way, to that intangible but essential quality known in aviation as ‘airmanship’.

After about 5 days off duty, I telephoned Australian Airlines’ crewing department and advised that I was fit for reserve duty ‘tomorrow’. The response, “Great, DJ, but it’s not reserve duty anymore: It’s a Melbourne-Sydney return (MEL-SYD-MEL), early tomorrow morning.”

In the middle of a course of antibiotics, I returned to our kitchen to help my wife prepare dinner and promptly sliced my thumb, instead of an onion! Four hours later, with a freshly-stitched and bandaged thumb, I rang crewing back and advised I was back on sick leave for one more day, feeling well able to commence a 2-day trip on the following morning.

Two mornings later, while I was driving out to Melbourne Airport, I realised that I’d forgotten to pack my anti-biotic tablets. ‘Oh well, it’s only a 2-day trip – bad luck‘, I thought.

After parking and making my way to the MEL terminal, I signed on and prepared to flight plan our first day’s flying: Melbourne-Adelaide-Alice Springs-Darwin (MEL-ADL-ASP-DRW). As I reached in my jacket pocket for my reading glasses, I realised that I’d left them at home, too. ‘Oh we’ll, we’re only flying 6 sectors over the 2 days and only one is at night‘, I reasoned. ‘I do have my second, tinted pair of sunglasses and my first officer can fly the last leg: I’ll just crank up my cockpit lighting!’

We completed and filed the flight plan, headed for the gate, to pre-flight our B737-300; we even managed to push back on time – a minor miracle of logistics, I always thought!

After some time after take-off, well-established in the climb, we both became aware of a somewhat disconcerting irregular and intermittent noise that seemed to emanate from outside and under the nose of the aircraft. I thought it sounded ‘mechanical‘, like the ground engineer’s access panel for the headphone socket; my FO thought it sounded more like some sort of odd electronic signal, coming from the cockpit aural warning speaker, situated on the side of the centre pedestal, between us, by his left knee. We couldn’t resolve the issue, either way. It certainly didn’t seem serious and we wrote it up in the aircraft technical log, for the engineers in ADL to assess.

After arrival and engine shut-down in ADL, my first question to the receiving engineer after he plugged in, was whether or not the access panel was open on arrival. It wasn’t, so we started exploring other possible causes of the unusual sound we had experienced. In the middle of that discussion, he asked us to confirm our fuel uplift for the next sector to Alice Springs. I gave him the figure from memory, without first confirming from our flight plan.

The penny dropped as we were completing our cockpit preparation, while our passengers were still boarding: I had given the engineer the wrong fuel figure. 8.00 tonnes, not 11.0, as planned. There were no weather considerations, but we had planned to carry Mount ISA, in Queensland, the then nearest alternate aerodrome, as Alice has just one usable runway. Many experienced pilots take this precaution, in such circumstances: it widens the options. I asked the FO to radio our company and request the refuellers back to top us up to 11.0 tonnes.

The first officer seemed reluctant to do so; I asked again. He said, “We’ll be delayed”. I replied, “I don’t care, I want the fuel. He kept pushing: “But 8.00 tonnes is legal.” “But is it safe?”, I asked. He kept on resisting my request to call the company. We needed a circuit breaker.

I said, “Just give me a minute: I want to meditate.” “You want to WHAT?”, he asked. “I want to meditate.” I closed my eyes briefly, ignoring him and everything else, while I re-capped the day’s progress, so far. I’d left my tablets and my glasses at home, We still had the noise issue, unresolved by the engineers – and – I’d caused the wrong fuel figure to be loaded. After about 30 seconds, I opened my eyes and looked at my watch. It wasn’t even 0900 hrs.

The B737 Master Warning light would not have been any clearer than the instinctive message I had received: I turned to my FO and asked of him, “How many events does it take to create a decent incident, or even an accident?” “Oh, say 5-7?”

“That’s right”, I said, “We are already up to 4: Do you want to try for 5, or 6? I’m not enjoying today, so far. Now, are you familiar with the term, ‘Command Decision’?”  “Yes, of course”, he said.  “Well mate, this is one of them. Now please – call the company – I want that fuel.”  We had to wait ages for the tanker to return and we finally departed about 17 minutes late, self-chastened, but feeling much more comfortable. The paperwork could wait until later. (The unusual ‘noise’ issue was never actually resolved by the engineers – but neither did it re-occur on the subsequent 2 sectors.)

The leg above the Simpson Desert to Alice Springs was clear and as beautiful as ever and we commenced our descent into Alice.

This is absolutely true: As we passed through 7000 ft at about 25nm out and still at 300kts IAS, the Tower controller called us and asked, “What’s your fuel endurance (fuel remaining, expressed in minutes), right now?” My FO responded (- we had plenty of fuel to hold and/or to divert to ISA). “Oh, that’s good”, replied the controller, “Because we have a disabled aircraft on the runway, right now.”

The expression on my FO’s face was incredulous. “How did you know that was going to happen“, he asked, “Because you did know, didn’t you?” I replied, “No, I couldn’t have known that a Piper Navaho light twin was going to blow a main gear tyre on landing, but the signs were there, that something along those lines was bound to happen. They just stood out, like that Master Warning red light can.”

We had to hold above Alice Springs for about 50 minutes, so we took the opportunity to do some scenic flying around Alice and the famed McDonnell Ranges in the ‘red centre’, while engineers worked to remove the disabled Navaho from the runway, so we could land. A rival company’s B727, behind us and still well south of Alice, didn’t have any extra fuel to hold and had to return to Adelaide.

On shut-down, the company Traffic Officer boarded and she commented, “We saw the ‘delayed-departure-Captain-wanted-more-fuel’ report in the computer and wondered, ‘What’s he want more fuel for? There’s not a cloud in the sky! Then, we learned about the runway being closed. How did you know that was going to happen, because it hadn’t, at the time of your departure?”

There was nothing concrete that had warned me of that impending event.

I didn’t need it: My instincts had arced up, after I had recognised the way in which  the pattern of our day was unfolding. I was far from comfortable, so I insisted on recovering the situation with something that you can never have too much of: Fuel (- unless, of course, you are on fire!) Our original, flight-planned fuel figure was well researched, as it turned out.

The clear message is: ‘Learn to trust your instincts. They are an invaluable and innate Master Warning System: Something we were all born with. They cost nothing and they do work.

Sometimes, things just don’t feel quite right … it may well be that they’re not.

You can practise developing them further, by applying them as a cross-check of your more conscious thought processes, such as when ordering from a restaurant menu. (How many times have you had an initial instinctive impulse to order a dish, ignored it and then lived to regret it?)

The other great and obvious take-out for me, from this day, was ‘do not return to flying duties (or any critical work) from sick leave, until you have fully recovered‘.

 

Wishing you many safe landings

 

Captain David M Jacobson FRAeS MAP

 

Would you care to experience that unsurpassed sense of accomplishment, derived from executing consistently beautiful landings, more often?

For starters, Download the FREE Jacobson Flare LITE, our no fuss/no frills introduction. Here we demonstrate, step by step, the application of the Jacobson Flare on a typical grass airstrip at Porepunkah, YPOK.

 

We invite you to browse the consistently positive comments on our Testimonials page. Many pilots, of all levels of experience, have downloaded our Apps. Read about their own experiences with the Jacobson Flare technique and the App.

Then download the COMPLETE Jacobson Flare app – for iOS. You’re already possibly paying $300+/hour to hire an aeroplane: You’ll recover the cost of the app, in just ONE LESS-NEEDED CIRCUIT. Moreover, you’ll have an invaluable reference tool, throughout your entire life in aviation.

Download the COMPLETE Jacobson Flare App for iOS devices now.

 

We invite you, also, to review our new, FREE companion app,

offering a convenient way of staying abreast of our latest blogs.

 

Download the Jacobson Flare NEWS App for iOS devices now.